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 Abstract 
Although Specialized Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units have traditionally deployed the majority 
of less lethal weapons, society demands that patrol officers have access to these weapons when facing the 
rise in "suicide by cop" and civil unrest incidents. 
Common police sense would seem to indicate a need for more legally and morally mandated, 
extended range less-lethal options for patrol officers. However, a review of case law, literature, surveys and 
interviews were combined to determine if that is true. Currently, courts do not mandate patrol-based less-
lethal weapons or support civil suits for failure to provide these alternatives to officers. However, agency 
surveys reveal a large movement towards expanding use of force continuums with less lethal options for 
police. Also, the increasing demand for patrol officers to deal with suicidal subjects and riots creates a 
moral obligation to explore more humane tools for de-escalation and resolution. The ultimate goal is to 
reduce the severity of citizen injuries and save lives. 
When considering patrol applications, needs-assessment and cost-analysis the decision was 
divided between the shotgun beanbag and the PepperBall. However, a more stringent focus on capabilities, 
limitations, familiarization, and expert opinions reveals the drag-stabilized shotgun beanbag is the best 
patrol-based option. 
In conclusion, even absent a legal obligation, the Garland Police Department has a moral 
obligation to proactively provide additional extended range less lethal weapons to the patrol toolbox. The 
sharp annual increase in suicidal protective custody arrests by the Garland Police Department supports this 
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Specialized Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units have traditionally held a monopoly on the 
firepower. However, in our ever-changing society, there appears to be a push toward moving some of these 
options back to the first responder level. One reason for this change is most small to mid-sized police 
agencies cannot afford to staff a full time SWAT team, yet some incidents develop so rapidly that they have 
been resolved before part-time SWAT personnel can respond. This requires patrol officers to use the only 
viable option available at the time -lethal force. In response to this problem some agencies have not only 
issued additional deadly force weapons to patrol, but are also considering extended range less lethal 
impact munitions. For example, the Midland Police Department has issued rifles to their officers and also 
considered providing them with beanbag shotguns (Kraft, 2000). 
Aside from departmental limitations, there have also been significant increases in suicide by cop 
and victim-precipitated homicide incidents. This underscores the need for additional force options between 
the baton and the firearm. In an analysis of police shootings from 19aO to 1996, roughly half of the 
incidents met the characteristics for victim-precipitated homicide (Parent 1996). Suicide by cop is the term 
used when a suicidal suspect threatens an officer with any force, including deadly force, causing the officer 
to kill him. Regardless of the suspect’s actions, society has begun to question officer discretion and agency 
policy when an officer takes the life of a suicidal person. Many current less lethal options for patrol officers 
are either ineffective, or they present an unacceptable officer safety hazard because of poor accuracy or 
limited range. This has resulted in a large push toward finding and implementing weapons that effectively 
meet the criteria for less lethal weapons. For the purpose of this paper, less lethal and less than lethal are 
interchangeable terms, referring to a weapons system that is designed to cause compliance through the 
use of force, yet not likely to cause death when correctly used. 
The author's research will seek to determine the need for additional less lethal weapons, 
specifically the extended range impact munitions, to be readily available to Garland's patrol officers. The 
Garland Police Department currently has a part-time SWAT team that deploys these weapons upon 
demand. Although the patrol division uses other less lethal devices such as pepper spray and impact 
batons, extended range less lethal impact weapons are not immediately available to the first-responder. 
When maintaining distance is critical (such as suicide by cop incidents), deadly force is the only option 
currently available to the officer. Although the broad range of less lethal weapons spans from pepper spray 
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to the threat of lethal force, this study will focus on extended range less lethal impact weapons that 
would be effective in suicide by cop incidents. 
The author also seeks to determine whether the Garland Police Department has any moral or legal 
obligation to provide extended range less lethal impact weapons to the patrol division. If an obligation is 
established, then it a further search for the best weapon for patrol applications will be conducted. The 
intended methods of research for this project are as follows: 
 Books on use of force and less lethal weapons 
 Articles related to less lethal weapons, suicide by cop, use of force and civil liabilities 
 Random surveys of police agencies that use less lethal projectiles in the patrol division 
 Interview at least one Expert on less lethal devices 
It is hypothesized that the Garland Police Department has a legal and moral obligation to provide 
patrol officers with additional less lethal options and failure to do so would result in civil liability. It is 
further hypothesized that the best plan of action would be placing the Sage SL6 37mm launcher in 
each of the supervisor cars. This would make the most effective weapon available, while reducing the 
costs associated with equipment training, ammunition, and recertifications. 
The significance of this research and its benefits to law enforcement are paramount. Placing 
another tool in the patrol officer's less lethal toolbox could have several positive effects. First, an 
additional less lethal option may save the lives of some suicidal suspects. Next, officers are less likely 
to experience the traumatic stress syndrome associated with taking a life. Finally, the Garland Police 
Department may reduce negative media attention, citizen criticism, and the risk of civil liability resulting 
from police shootings. 
Review of Literature 
The need for less lethal weapons is not a new issue in law enforcement It was identified in 1972, 
when the Department of Justice teamed up with the National Science Foundation to sponsor a national 
conference on that very topic. In 1985, the U.S. Supreme court ruled in Tennessee v. Gamer that deadly 
force could not be used against a fleeing felon (as cited by National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 1987). The 
following year, Attorney General Edwin Meese held another conference to assess the progress of less lethal 
research, look at technological advancements, and consider future developments of less lethal weapons. In 
the foreword to the report on this conference, Director of the National Institute of Justice, 
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James K. Stewart, wrote the following statement "Law enforcement officials have long recognized that a
wide and dangerous gap exists in the range of tools that are available to them" (NIJ, 1986, iii). They agreed 
that one weapon could not fill that "gap", because no single option could be used in every scenario or meet
all the law enforcement needs. It was also at this conference that the term nonlethal was abandoned with
the understanding that any weapon could be lethal if used inappropriately. In replacement came the phrase
less than lethal, which was defined as "devices or agents used to induce compliance with law enforcement
personnel without substantial risk of permanent injury or death to the subject” (NIJ, 1986, 
 2). 
In July 1991 and March 1992, the National Institute of Justice met again to review the research on 
less lethal weapons, but the topics for discussion were the same ones discussed in 1986. Several 
scenarios were chosen that would likely require less lethal weapons. However, it was noted that no current 
weapon could work for all of the scenarios and different situational factors could directly affect the 
usefulness of any less lethal weapon. (NIJ, 1993, 3). 
In the 1990's, an increasing number of suicidal subjects forced police officers to shoot them by 
threatening or assaulting the officer with a weapon. Richard B. Parent documented this phenomenon in a 
study of incidents he referred to as "victim-precipitated homicides." Roughly 48% of the police shootings 
that he analyzed had the characteristics of victim-precipitated homicide. In conclusion to his study, Parent 
recommended that agencies train recruits to deal with suicidal subjects and "nonlethal compliance tools be 
considered for deployment in the field (Parenl1996)." 
Concerns about reducing police use of force and police-citizen killings are not limited to the United 
States. In May of 1997, Chief David Boothby of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Services established a 
committee to review all possible strategies or methods to reduce the use of force, specifically, deadly force. 
The focus of this study was actually leaning toward the replacement of the firearm. After consulting with 
experts from the United States, England, Australia, and Canada, the committee reported that there was not 
a less lethal weapon available that could replace the firearm (Button, 1997). 
In a study of 99los Angeles County Police Shootings, 10% of the incidents were suicide attempts. 
The author labeled these attempts as, suicide by cop. This study also revealed another fact that was 
already known to most veteran officers; the majority of the suicidal subjects were either intoxicated or 
psychologically impaired (Pyers, 2001). This is extremely important information to consider when selecting 
a less lethal weapon because some of the chemical agents are known to be less effective on intoxicated 




intoxicated and 58% had a history of psychiatric problems. Another study of suicide by cop incidents from 
1992 to 1997 revealed that over 500k of the subjects were "under the influence of alcohol (Pyers, 2000, 4).
The Annuls of Emergency Medicine published a report on 40 police incidents, in which subjects 
who were shot with beanbags received a mental evaluation. An amazing 74% of the 39 that were screened 
for drugs or alcohol tested positive. Not only did 51 % of the subjects test positive for alcohol, but an 
additional 28% also tested positive for cocaine. Antidepressants were also detected, which reflects a history 
of psychiatric problems in those subjects. The authors stated that "68% of the patients who had the benefit 
of psychiatric evaluation had sufficiently impaired communication, judgment, or both that they would be 
unlikely to be able to comply with an arresting officers' instructions to submit” (de Brito et al, 2001,389). 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics published a study of justifiable homicides and police officers 
murdered by felons, which had two main points of interest to this study. First, police kill an average of 400 
suspects per year in justified shootings (NIJ. 2001, iii). If the statistics from Los Angeles County remain true, 
then approximately 40 people commit "suicide by cop" each year in the United States. In fact, experts 
estimate that 40 - 100 of the annual police-citizen killings are the result of victim-precipitated homicide, 
meaning the victim planned and caused his own death at the hands of another person (Paynter, 2000, 44). 
Many officers have no force option available to them between the pepper spray or baton and the firearm. If 
the suspect has a knife, the officer must maintain a minimum distance of at least 21 feet for his safety. The 
pepper spray and baton are not effective at this range, but if the officer closes that gap, he is placing his 
own life in jeopardy. The firearm is the officer's only viable option, leaving the officer no choice other than 
to shoot the suspect who turned the threat toward him. Many agencies have evaluated their police-citizen 
shootings and determined that the patrol officer needs additional less lethal weapons. Seattle Washington 
had a series of police involved shootings that drew a great deal of public attention. In response to this 
attention, they have purchased tasers and the beanbag shotguns for their patrol officers. The second point 
of interest was the number of officers present when the shootings occurred. According to the study, there 
were 8,578 felons killed by police from 1976 to 1998. In 86% of these cases, there was one officer at the 
scene. In 10%, two officers were present and three officers were present for the remaining 4% (NIJ, 2001, 
30). This data shows that 7378 of these shootings would have happened so quickly that less lethal 
weapons could not have been an option. In 96% (N=8235) of the shootings, the incident occurred before a 
third officer arrived, which would indicate that even a full-time SWAT team could not have responded in 
time. This supports the need for less lethal alternatives in a majority of the patrol cars. On the other hand, it 
also suggests that the outcome could have been different for at least 1200 of these shootings if less lethal 
had been immediately available. Unfortunately, there was no data collected on the exact time frame from 
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the arrival of the first responder to the time the shooting occurred shooting. Understandably, many of these 
were also lethal threats and less lethal weapons would have been inappropriate, but statistics for a 
quantifiable determination were not collected. 
The Seattle Police Department (SPD) studied three issues: (1) use of force nationwide and in 
Seattle, (2) fatal shootings nationwide from 1999-2000, and by Seattle officers from 1980 to present, and (3) 
less lethal force options used across the country and in Seattle (Seattle Police Department, 2001, 1). A 
Force Options Research Group (FOR G) and a Community Workgroup on Less Lethal Options were formed 
to assess the less lethal alternatives and recommend policy changes within the Seattle Police Department. 
In the study of 33 fatal shootings over a 22-year period, 24% of the subjects were armed with a weapon 
other than a firearm. When exploring less lethal options, SPD surveyed 23 agencies about their less lethal 
option programs. Only 17 of the 23 agencies allowed patrol officers to deploy less lethal weapons, and 15 
of the 17 only issued them to designated officers (SPD Special report, 2001, 15). The first change 
recommended by FORG was a 4O-hours Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) course for select officers, who 
could then teach an 8-hour course to the remaining officers. Apparently, one less lethal option did not meet 
all the needs of the 130 patrol officers. As recommended, the two less lethal options, M26 Tasers (130) and 
beanbag shotguns (130), were added to the patrol division. The weapons considered in this study included 
but were not limited to the PepperBall, the 12-gauge beanbag, and the 37mm beanbags and batons. 
The incidents involving suicide by police have become common to every police agency. The 
knowledge of less lethal weapons is widespread and seems to be a topic in most tactical magazines and 
police tactical conferences. For example, the Tactical Edge had an article on less lethal weapons in every 
issue for the year 2000. According to Ross and Jones, "the need to train officers in the constitutional use of 
less-than-Iethal force is so 'obvious' that the failure to train could properly be characterized as 'deliberate 
indifference' to the constitutional rights of the citizen." (1996) 
In addition to numerous articles on suicide by cop and less lethal weapons, studies on the 
effectiveness of the various weapons have increased. While the three categories have not changed, the 
number of manufacturers has increased, making it more difficult for police departments to select a less 
lethal weapon system. In response to this dilemma came the Attribute Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-
Than-Lethal, Extended-Range, Impact Munitions. The Los Angeles Sheriffs Office and Pennsylvania State 
University's Applied Research Laboratory conducted this two-day study in February 2001. During the study, 
the researchers evaluated 80 different types of less-than-Iethal impact munitions and compared them 
based upon cost, accuracy at 21 and 75 feet, and momentum. Accuracy was based on dispersion, rather 
than "point of aim, point of impact", to eliminate the need to site in each weapon used for the project The 
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accuracy was measured at 21 feet because that is the recommended minimum distance to maintain from a 
subject with a knife. The 75 feet measurement is a little more complex. The average distance that a man can 
throw 1.2-pound object is 180 feet. This is the recommended minimum distance to maintain from a rioter who is 
throwing objects at the police. Because none of the current less lethal weapons can accurately shoot 180 feet a 
distance of 75 feet was used. The information provided in this study will go a long way toward assisting agencies 
in sorting through all the vendors and options in order to select the best less lethal weapon for their needs. The 
XM1006 Defense Technology sponge round was reported to have a dispersion rate of 9 inches at a distance of 
21 feet but only 5 inches at 75 feet Two other accuracy ratings of interest were the Drag Stabilized 12 gauge 
round by Defense Technologies and the PepperBall encapsulated OC round, which had dispersions of 3 inches 
and 7 inches at 21 feet respectively (Kenny et al, 2001). 
Although there are studies on the effectiveness of the weapon in testing, there is little data on the 
effectiveness of the weapons for law enforcement applications. Several deaths were reported from the use of 
beanbags, causing some agencies to be hesitant to purchase them. The first study of injuries, effectiveness, 
and deaths caused by less lethal weapons was conducted by Ken Hubbs of David Klinger through a grant 
funded by the National Institute of Justice. Surveys were sent to nearly 700 agencies, but only 106 agencies 
responded to the survey. This report contained data on all deaths related to bean bags in the United States and 
Canada, but does not have the complete data on every beanbag shooting. 
However, it does provide a good sample of the patterns in injuries caused by different munitions and 
launchers under varying conditions. The data collected consisted of case reports on 373 separate beanbag 
shooting and an analysis of each of the 969 rounds that were reportedly fired in those shootings. Out of the 969 
rounds fired, 782 impacted the suspects and 87% of those impacts resulted in only bruises, abrasions, and 
lacerations (Hubbs, 2002, 16). There were 10 fatalities included in the report, which, according to the author, 
included all of the beanbag-related deaths. Two of the ten were actually misloaded rounds - one door breech 
and one barricade penetrating round. The 37mm launchers (5 rounds) and shotgun beanbag rounds (3) caused 
the remaining eight deaths. The author noted that officers were being called upon more frequently to deal with 
suicidal and emotionally disturbed persons (EDP), which was leading to an increase in the need for less lethal 
alternatives. In addition, it was noted that suicidal EDP's made up nearly half of the subjects who were shot in 
this study (Hubbs et AI, 2002, 3-7). The author concluded that the less lethal munitions did save lives. This was 
because lethal rounds result in death approximately 50% of the time, but only 2.2% of the less lethal rounds 
were shown fatal. (This is far less than lethal rounds, which are reportedly fatal in almost 50% of the shootings.) 
The fatality percentage for less lethal rounds was possibly 
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inflated, because beanbag shootings are under-reported and lack any consistency. If all of the shootings 
had been reported, this percentage would have been even lower. Another notation was that 93% of the 
incidents in this study were resolved with no lethal rounds fired, but deadly force would have been justified 
in 90% of the incidents. Finally, at least one of the deaths in the report was intended and justified based on 
the deadly threat that the officers were facing. (Hubbs et AI, 2002, 10-21) 
The International Wound Ballistics Association conducted another study regarding less lethal 
weapons. This study analyzed the accuracy of the drag stabilized and square beanbag projectiles shot from 
smoothbore and rifled 12 gauge shotgun barrels. The rounds fired from the 20-inch cylinder bore barrels 
were more accurate in all of the ammunition tested. The drag stabilized bean bag projectile held a 5 inch 
group at 50 feet in the smoothbore, while it degraded to an 8 inch group in the rifled barrel. The square 
bean bag projectiles shot at groups of 9 % inches in the smoothbore barrel and several types square bags 
fired from the rifled barrel ranged up to 30 inches center to center. The researchers also reported a 
significant drop in velocity for the square beanbags fired through the rifled barrels. The cause of inaccuracy 
and loss of momentum were attributed to the bag flattening out sooner when fired from the rifled barrel, 
which resulted in an increase of wind resistance and the likeliness to stray from its path. The study involved 
shooting several pigs with custom loaded 12 gauge drag stabilized beanbags. These rounds pre-loaded for 
velocities of 400, 350, 300, and 250 feet per second (ft/sec). The pigs were then shot with each round. The 
rounds traveling 350 and 400 ft/sec penetrated into the pig. The rounds at 250 and 300 ft/sec did not 
penetrate. The “v50”, a velocity at which 500k of the rounds would either penetrate or not was determined to 
be 335 ft/sec. A standard drag stabilized round was an average of 292 ft/second, which is well below the 
penetration velocities. The authors of the research were also familiar with 7 of the 8 deaths that have 
occurred from less lethal weapons and noted that no deaths had been caused by the drag stabilized 
beanbag.(Po~ey,2001) 
Professor William C. Bailey of Cleveland State University conducted a study on the effect of "Iess-
than-lethal weapons" on police-citizen killing. This study sought to determine if providing officers with less 
lethal weapons would reduce the number of citizens killed by police officers. The author gathered 
information on less lethal options within each agency and correlated that with the number of justifiable 
homicides that had occurred. In his study, he failed to find that providing less lethal weapons had any effect 
on police-citizen shootings. On the contrary, he found that they did not reduce justifiable homicides in 
agencies where they were provided. It should be noted that this study involved pepper spray, batons, 
electrical and restraint devices, but did include extended range less lethal impact weapons. Only 6.6% of 
the agencies reported the use of "other" types of less lethal, which could have been extended range, and 
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that category was excluded from analysis. If anything, this study would support that the handheld less lethal options in 
the 1990 study were ineffective in reducing the number of justifiable homicides (Bailey, 1996). 
Each of the studies listed three categories of munitions: the chemical, the impact, and the electrical weapons. 
Although the types of less lethal weapons have not changed over the past 30 years, there have been significant 
improvements. The drag stabilized round is an improvement of the square bag for several reasons. First it does not 
tumble in flight. Second, it is at least twice as accurate, because it is more aerodynamic and it has a reduced loss of 
velocity. Last studies have shown it to have a lower barrel velocity, reducing penetration fatalities. 
Each study on less lethal weapons found that there were several conditions that may require the use of a less 
lethal weapon, such as a fleeing felon, hostage taker, suicidal person, or civil unrest. Additionally, the studies pointed 
out that no current weapon was best in all of these incidents and the type of incident dictates the best choice of 
weapon. The studies also focused on several of the following similar 
factors that were critical to the selection of a less lethal weapon. 
• Accuracy (The weapon should be highly accurate and able to hit only the intended target) 
 The gauge for accuracy was the dispersion rates at 21 and 75 feet of nine inches or less; 
 based on the standard width of a man being 18 inches. Any variance greater than 9 inches from center 
 of target would be likely to miss. 
• Multiple shot capacity (The weapon should be capable of firing more than one shot without 
   reloading. ) 
• Durability (Be capable of being operated in most environmental conditions without failure.) 
• Effectiveness (The weapon should be capable of incapacitating a suspect) 
• Range (The weapon should be accurate and effective at distances from 21 to 75 feet) 
• Minimal Injury (Although, "less lethal" might indicate, the use of the weapon normally would not 
    cause death, selection should consider potential for injury and death.) 
• Filling the gaps (The weapon must supplement rather than replace or add to current levels of 
    force available to the officer.) 
• Cost effectiveness (Unfortunately, cost is a factor and will influence the purchasing decision of 
    most agencies. However, the agency should research grants available through the National 
     Institute of Justice for grants that fund less lethal option programs.) 
The final consideration is placement of the weapons. In the literature, two methods of providing 
patrol with less lethal options are found. First equipping all district patrol squads with less-lethal weapons 
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and authorizing all patrols officer to deploy the weapon. Second, many agencies place the weapon in 
 street supervisor cars and permit deployment by only selected personnel. This is a very important decision, 
because it affects how many weapons will need to be purchased, as well as the startup cost for 
ammunition. According to Cole, officers encountering an armed suicidal person need the weapons 
immediately. Therefore, it is pointless to have less lethal or non-lethal in a sergeant’s car or SWAT van 
when an officer needs them (2001). Morales also wrote that providing patrol with immediate access to less 
lethal results in less injuries and fatalities, reducing civil suits (Morales et al, 2001). 
 Methodology 
Should police agencies provide extended range, less lethal impact munitions to the patrol division 
in order to reduce citizen deaths? If so, what should be the basis for selecting that weapon and what is the 
best choice of weapon to provide to patrol officers? 
It is hypothesized that agencies have a moral and legal obligation to provide additional less lethal 
alternatives to patrol officers and the failing to do so is a poor decision, which could have some serious 
negative impacts upon a law enforcement agency. It is further hypothesized that the Sage SL6 would meet 
all the needs of the police agency and therefore be the best choice of weapon to assign patrol 
personnel. 
In order to determine the need for less lethal weapons in the patrol division of the Garland 
Police Department an analysis was conducted of protective custody arrests classified as suicidal or 
emotionally disturbed from 1997-2001. The results were studied to determine the frequency that citizens 
become 
suicidal to the point that they require hospitalization. In order to research this issue further, the author 
conducted surveys (see Appendixes A and B) and interviews of law enforcement supervisors, including a 
40-minute recorded interview with an expert consultant on less lethal weapons, Captain Larkin Fourkiller. 
Surveys were sent to 50 randomly selected agencies, inquiring about the use of less lethal weapons at that 
agency, the type of weapons used, the number of deployments, and the results of those deployments. This 
survey sought to determine the number of incidents involving deadly force at their agency one year prior to, 
and after implementing less lethal weapons. Deadly force included any time that an officer fired at a 
suspect, regardless of whether the suspect was missed, injured or killed. Information was also solicited 
about the less lethal options available to the patrol officers, and the use / success ratio for each weapon. 
The agencies that do not provide less lethal weapons to patrol were excluded from the ratios. Only 30 
agencies responded to the surveys. These 30 responses were analyzed to determine if providing patrol 
officers with extended range less weapons would reduce incidents involving deadly force for that agency. 
They were also analyzed to determine which weapon is most effective or least effective from the 
perspective of law enforcement personnel. 
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An additional survey was conducted of 28 police supervisors who were attending the Law 
Enforcement Management Institute-Module II. The supervisors varied in rank from Sergeant to Assistant 
Chief and worked for cities ranging from 2000 to 1.3 million citizens. This survey asked whether they felt 
that the less lethal weapons should be used by patrol officers or limited to SWAT personnel. They were also 
asked for a recommendation on the best less lethal weapon to issue patrol officers and all of the data for 
the original survey was collected from their department. Nineteen of the 28 surveys were returned. These 
19 surveys were analyzed to determine whether police supervisors feel there is a need for less lethal 
weapons at the patrol level and get their opinions regarding the best weapon for the job. 
The current case law was reviewed to determine the following. Is an agency legally obligated to 
provide a less lethal weapon to patrol officers? Is any liability associated with failing to do so? Is a 
department liable if they have less lethal, but do not use it? 
The interview with Captain Larkin Fourkiller focused on the technical aspects of less lethal 
weapons, the comparison of the various weapon systems, and the best choice to issue to patrol personnel. 
Mr. Fourkiller is an instructor in less lethal weapons, serves as a consultant in use of force and 
weapons training issues, writes articles on cutting edge issues related to less lethal weapons, and speaks 
at conferences for tactical police associations. This actually consisted of a two-part interview. The first 
interview consisted of an overview of the various less lethal weapons that were available, the ammunitions 
and background for each, and general research advice. This interview was conducted prior to any extensive 
research with the intent of providing the author with enough knowledge of less lethal weapons to conduct a 
comprehensive study on the subject. The second interview was conducted after completion of all 
independent research. The intent of this interview was to gain an expert opinion on the best less lethal 
option for patrol using direct, technical questions. It was further intended to provide Mr. Larkin an 
opportunity to point out any areas or options that may have been overlooked through the research. Last, 
Mr. Larkin was solicited for an expert opinion regarding the best choice of less lethal to provide to the patrol 
division. 
Finally, a costs analysis was done for the weapons that met the accuracy and logistical needs for 
the patrol division. This included original startup costs and training, maintenance, re-certification, and 
ammunition replacement Garland Police Department has 120 patrol officers, who staff at least 22 patrol 
districts throughout four sectors. The method of analyzing ammunitions was based on the expert or 
manufacturer suggestions for quantities of training and duty ammunition. The quantity and placement of 
weapons were based upon the need for immediate patrol access to less lethal weapons and based on the 
following conclusion. In order to meet patrol needs. One weapon should be placed in each district and 
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supervisor car. Realizing that funds may not permit this allocation of weapons, the costs were figured on 
placing the weapon in each supervisor car (4), half of the sector cars (11), with 5 extra weapons for 
training, replacement or SWAT deployment. The total equipment cost was therefore based upon the 
purchase of 20 weapons, along with ammunition (live and training) and accessories needed for that 
weapon. The total training costs were figured for training 60 officers, which would permit training all patrol 
supervisors and Field Training Officers. The data for this was gathered from vendors' quotes, catalogs and 
prices on the Internet 
Findings 
Garland Police Department records reveal 754 protective custody arrests from 1997 to 2001. The 
arrests were categorized as protective custody - suicidal (PCS) and protective custody - mental (PCM). 
Seventy-two percent (N=544) of the protective custody arrests were for suicidal subjects and 28% (N=210) 
were mentally disturbed. From 1997-1999, Garland Officers took an annual average of 91 suicidal subjects 
and 42 mentally disturbed subjects into custody for mental evaluation. In the year 2000, the mentally 
disturbed subjects decreased 14% below the 3-year average (42). However, in 2001 the mentally disturbed 
subjects increased 12% above the 3-year average. Furthermore, the number of suicidal subjects was 
above the 3-year average by 300k in 2000 and 55% in 2001 (see Table 1).  
I Table 1 
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Even more eye opening was the number of subjects handled more than once. For example, in 2000 the 
number of "repeat customers" increased 51 % over the 3-year average and in 2001 they increased 126% 
over the 3-year average (as reported by Debbie Bettes, Crime Analyst for the Garland Police Department). 
The survey results revealed that 56% of responding agencies provide less lethal weapons to their 
patrol officers. Shotgun beanbags were provided by 71 % of the agencies, while other weapons were 
retained for SWAT team deployment In fact, only 17% of the agencies used the 40mm, 12% used 
PepperBall, and 6% used the 37mm launcher (see Table 2). 









There were 225 reported less lethal deployments, with 95% of those labeled "successful." Out of the 
"successful" deployments, 84% were deployed during 2001 Austin and Cincinnati riots. The shotgun 
beanbag made up 6?Ok of the .successful" deployments. Six deadly force incidents occurred prior to 
implementation of the less lethal impact weapons, one resulting in death. However, only one incident of 
deadly force was reported after adding less lethal weapons to patrol. The exception was in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
which reported one lethal deadly force incident during a time that the Tasers were being used by their 
agency. According to the representative from Cincinnati, the Taser was not used because 23 prior 
deployments resulted in only "limited success." Incidentally, shotgun beanbags were added in 1997 
because of this shooting and no further deadly force incidents have occurred (personal communication with 
Doug Ventre, 2/22/2002). 
Only 52% of surveyed supervisors had an opinion of the best less lethal weapon for patrol officers. 
75% of those felt that the shotgun beanbag was the best choice, while the remaining 25% was divided 
equally between the Sage 37mm and the Taser. 95% of these supervisors that patrol officers should be 
        Two or more of 
 these were 
Table 2 Weapons provided to patrol by responding agencies 
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given less lethal devices, but 5% felt that only SWAT team members should use the weapon. 
Tennessee v. Gamer and Graham v. Conner have laid the legal foundation for use of force. 
Tennessee v. Gamer limits officers from using deadly force to stop a fleeing felon (1985). Graham v. 
Conner sets the "reasonableness standard" to determine whether force was excessive. Nearly every 
subsequent case involving unlawful seizure or excessive force will cite one or both of these cases, which is 
why they both have indirectly molded the direction of case law regarding less lethal force. For example, in 
1994, police shot Michael G. Roy after he lunged toward the officers with two knives. During appeal, the 
plaintiff argued that the officers were inadequately trained in "non-lethal alternatives for subduing 
dangerous but intoxicated persons"(Roy v. City of Lewiston [a]). The court rejected this argument in and 
supported the lower court ruling that it was "not in the business of dictating what equipment must be made 
available to the police officers or requiring them to be up to date on the newest developments in controlling 
unruly individuals" Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston [b] (1994). Another case that has been cited in 
several publications promoting less lethal weapons is O'Neal v DeKalb County, Georgia (1988). These 
articles refer to a dissenting criticism by Circuit Judge Clark for not providing less lethal alternatives, yet 
they fail to discuss the fact that the majority decision was made in favor of DeKalb County. Actually, the 
majority opinion was that the officers were not liable or guilty of violating the suspect’s rights after he 
stabbed six people and charged officers with a knife, causing the officer to shoot him. In the district trial of 
O'Neal v. DeKalb, the plaintiff's argued that the officers should have used alternative force. But the court 
disagreed, stating that the Constitution does not require officers to use a minimum amount to force to 
prevent a deadly force assault (O'Neal v. DeKalb, 1987). In a similar case, Plakas v. Drinski (1994) the 
court ruled, "officers have no duty to use alternate force levels when deadly force is justified.' 
In Canton vs. Harris (1989) the court ruled that an agency is liable for failure to train, only when 
that failure amounts to a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of the citizen (as cited by Ross and Jones, 
1996). Ross and Jones concluded that the need to train officers in the constitutional use of less-than-Iethal 
force is so 'obvious,' that the failure to train properly could properly be characterized as 'deliberate 
indifference' to the constitutional rights of the citizen" (Ross and Jones, 1996, 252). 
The final area of this research sought to determine the best extended-range less lethal weapon for 
patrol officers. In reviewing the criteria, it became obvious that there were two additional categories of less 
lethal weapons available. The injury potential for each dictates placement at different levels on Garland's 
escalating force continuum. This continuum places use of force on an increasing scale that is based upon 
the risk of injury or death to the suspect. The proper level of force is chosen based upon the actions or 
resistance of the suspect 
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The first new category identified (Soft Extended Range Weapons) is a level between pepper spray 
and the baton. PepperBall and the Taser were placed in this category because they have minimal risk of 
injury and virtually no risk of death when used properly. The desired affect at this level is consistent with the 
Pressure Point and Control Tactics (PPCT) term, "pain compliance". However, the Taser was not selected 
due to poor accuracy and range. The second category (Intermediate Extended Range Impact Weapons) is 
placed between the baton and firearm because there is a greater risk of injury when using this weapon. 
There is a minimal risk of death when the weapon is used appropriately, but people have died from less 
lethal impact rounds. The critical issue with this weapon is the proper selection of ammunition (the drag-
stabilized beanbag). The desired affect of this weapon is incapacitation by creating a disabling effect similar 
to the PPCT term, “"motor dysfunction." 
The PepperBall was selected for the soft extended range weapon for the following reasons. The 
PepperBall (with optional laser sites) is accurate up to 30 feet, which is well past the 21 feet edged-weapon 
reaction range. It is also effective up to 100 feet for the purpose of crowd control through saturation. 
Further, there are two aspects related to the effectiveness of the PepperBall: Kinetic Impact and Powdered 
OC pepper. The 8-10 ft/Ibs. of kinetic impact and 5% pepper are further enhanced by the 180 round 
capacity of the weapon. The projectiles are .68 caliber round balls, similar to paintballs. The OC pepper 
within the 2-gram capsules is supplied by Armor Holdings. This PepperBall was tested by San Diego Police 
Department and found to shoot a 7 -inch group at 21 feet (Kenny et AI, 2001). This weapon has minimal 





and training cost 


























(see Table 3). 
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The 12-gauge shotgun beanbag was the second weapon found to meet the requirements of ''filling 
the gap" with less lethal weapons. The beanbag round recommended is the Defense Technology 23DS, 
drag stabilized round. This round was more accurate at 75 feet than its competitors of similar design. 
Although the CTS Supersock was featured as the "most accurate less lethal round ever tested by the 
NTOA" in a Tactical Edge article written by Steve Ijames (1999, 60), the Defense Technology 23DS 
showed to be more accurate at 75 ft. Both of the rounds held 3 inch dispersions at 21 feet however, the 
dispersion of the CTS round was 11.5 inches verses the Defense Technology round's 6.5 inch dispersion 
(Kenny et AI, 2001). Although this 39-gram bag has a kinetic energy of around 120 foot pounds, the risk of 
injuries or death is decreased by reduced velocity and greater accuracy than the outdated square 
beanbags. At the time of this study, there have been 10 deaths associated with less lethal munitions. 
However, further investigation reveals that 2 of those deaths were attributed to misloaded rounds, 5 were 
caused by 37mm weapons (primarily the K01 and K01 LE rounds), and 3 were shot with the square 
shotgun beanbag round. Finally, 2 of the 3 shotgun rounds were the result of striking inappropriate targets 
(the chest), but the cause of the third was still being investigated (Hubbs et AI, 1998). In conclusion, it is 
found that the shotgun round has potential to kill if used inappropriately, but correct training and new 
technology will make large strides in preventing those deaths. 
It is understood that the Garland Police Department may not be able to implement both of the 
weapons that meet the requirements for patrol. Therefore, given all of the variables involved, the second 
less lethal weapon was found the best option for patrol. The basis for this finding was the applications in 
which patrol would use either of the weapons. From reports by other agencies, there are two basic 
applications for patrol to apply the less lethal weapon. The first was in suicide by cop incidents and the 
second was in civil unrest or riots. 
The Garland Police Department has shown to have an increase in dealings with suicidal or 
emotionally disturbed persons over the past five years. There have also been small-scale incidents of civil 
disorder, which usually involved a citywide call for assistance from all on-duty police officers. Each of these 
has a great potential for injury or death to citizens or officers. When considering the application of weapons 
to armed suicidal persons, the shotgun beanbag is clearly the better choice. The beanbag has a greater 
accuracy range, which allows for proper distancing. It has a greater kinetic impact, resulting in an increased 
likeliness that the suspect will be immediately incapacitated and unable to continue his threats. Less lethal 
expert, Larkin Fourkiller, equated the difference in kinetic impacts of the PepperBall verses the beanbag to 
the difference of "being punched by a ten-year old girl or a professional boxer". He also indicated that he 
felt the shotgun to be the best selection for patrol, when considering all of the factors involved. (Personal 
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communication, February 2nd 2002). The PepperBall has great potential for ending confrontations, but if 
given a choice between the two systems, the shotgun is found to be more effective. Although the 
PepperBall also relies on OC pepper to disable a suspect, OC is found less effective on impaired or 
emotionally disturbed persons, which consists of nearly 74% of suicidal subjects. For example, the 
Carrollton Police Department recently shot a suicidal person 12 times with the PepperBall, while he plunged 
a knife into his own chest. The beanbag has saved countless lives and has a long track record of 
successful deployments, while the PepperBall is new territory and should be approached cautiously with 
failsafe measures to back it up. Finally, all officers are familiar with the shotgun, so it will require less 
training and familiarization than a new weapon. Regarding riots, Cincinnati Police reported the shotgun to 
be effective in the 2001 riot where they fired 140 rounds with no injuries. These facts support the finding 
that the beanbag is the most effective tool for both patrol applications, particularly with the "Suicide by Cop" 
 incidents. As a safety precaution, the shotguns should be clearly marked dedicated weapons that are never 
used for lethal ammunition. Florescent stocks and fore-grips should be added to clearly identify the shotgun 
as a less than lethal weapon. The initial equipment cost for this weapon will be approximately $5000 and 
training will cost $1200 (see Table 3). This includes replacing the stock and handgrip on existing shotguns 
with florescent orange equipment In summary, the 12-gauge, cylinder bore shotgun with Defense 
Technology's 23DS drag-stabilized round is more accurate, carries more momentum, and is more cost-
effective less lethal weapon system (see Tables 4 and 5 for accuracy and momentum comparisons). 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to determine the need for additional less lethal weapons in the patrol 
division of the Garland Police Department. The research further sought to explore the question of legal and 
moral obligation to use alternative levels of force on suicidal subjects. If an obligation was established, then 
it sought to explore the options and determine the best choice of weapon to provide for patrol application. 
It was hypothesized that the Garland Police Department has a legal and moral obligation to provide 
patrol officers with additional less lethal alternatives and failure to do so would result in civil liability. 
However, the research only partially supports this hypothesis. The majority of support comes from the 
statistics of the Garland Police Department regarding suicidal subjects. This and other increases in suicidal 
subjects and civil unrest confronting patrol officers have intensified a 3O-year search for less lethal 
weapons in law enforcement. In the infant stages, less lethal research focused on military needs and 
replacement of the firearm. Very early on, participants abandoned the non-lethal search and settled for 
options that were less than lethal. This term finally changed to less lethal because of the realization that any 
of the current tools could be lethal if used incorrectly, but that many of them had less potential to kill than a 
firearm. After years of research, there is still no single less lethal weapon that can be used for every 
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scenario or hope to replace deadly force. The needs and focus on law enforcement applications have not 
reduced; in fact the opposite is true. Incidents of suicide by cop have been identified in 10-15% of most 
police shootings and up to 50% in certain municipal police shootings. 
The Garland Police Department has seen an increase in suicidal subjects, arresting over 750 
subjects in a 5-year period who were suicidal or mentally ill. The number over suicidal subjects alone has 
increased by 30% and 55% for 2000 and 2001. Incidents have occurred that met the characteristics of 
suicide by cop and the officer correctly used deadly force. In addition, studies on less lethal weapons have 
shown them to have less potential for killing than the firearm, hence the term "less lethal.» The firearm kills 
approximately half of the time, yet it takes up to 400 lives per year at the hands of law enforcement 
Granted, many of those involved immediate danger to the officer and common sense would dictate that 
lethal force it the only option. At least 10%, however, were cases where the subject wanted to die and got 
the police to do the job for them. Since 96% of the shootings occurred with only two or fewer officers on 
scene and SWAT did not have time to respond, the officers were left to handle the incident with the only 
sensible force available -lethal force. This has drawn much public attention and criticism, leading agencies 
to search for less lethal alternative to these difficult calls. Therefore, the findings do support the hypothesis 
that the agency has a moral obligation to provide additional less lethal weapons to the patrol officers and 
train the officers to deal with suicidal persons. 
However, the findings do not support any legal obligation for agencies to provide additional less 
lethal weapons to patrol officers. In fact the cases reviewed rejected claims that agencies were liable for 
failure to provide less lethal weapons and training. One court ruled that a failure to train must amount to a 
deliberate indifference to the rights of the citizen. Some of the literature that was reviewed stated a case in 
support of less lethal weapons, but the review of the case revealed that opinion to be from a dissenting 
judge, rather than the majority ruling. Finally, the court cases ruled an agency that has less lethal options 
available would not be liable for failure to use it when deadly force was justified. 
In review of the weapons systems and munitions available and the research on less lethal, a 
criteria was established for selecting the best less lethal weapon for patrol. It was hypothesized that the 
best plan would be to place the Sage 37mm SL6 in the patrol supervisor cars. This hypothesis was not 
supported by the findings of this study. The Sage SL6 (drag stabilized) was less accurate than several 
others were, including the drag stabilized shotgun beanbag, and exact impact 40mm. The K01 rounds were 
the cause of five impact weapon deaths. The cost to purchase 20 weapons and train 60 officers with the 
Sage SL6 and Exact Impact rounds would cost about $43,945. 
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Two options did meet the criteria for the less lethal weapon needs of patrol. They were the 
PepperBall and the drag stabilized, 12-gauge beanbag. The PepperBall was accurate up to 30 feet and has 
the combination or kinetic impact and OC pepper. This weapon has the capacity to fire up to 180 rounds at 
the rate of six rounds per second, which makes it an excellent option for crowd control. The .68 
caliber pepper-filled capsules travel up to 350 feet per second and can affect subjects up to 100 feet away 
through area saturation. This weapon should be classified as Soft Extended Range Weapons and placed in 
11 district cars. 
The 12-gauge drag stabilized beanbag was the most accurate weapon and ammunition 
combination out of 80 rounds tested by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office. Surveys revealed that 71 % of 
agencies that have less lethal in patrol chose the shotgun beanbag as one of the less lethal alternatives. 
Those same agencies reported a 100% reduction in use of deadly force after adding the shotgun beanbag 
to the patrol division. Additionally studies reveal that extended range impact weapons have caused 10 
known deaths across the United States and in Canada. However, the use of the beanbag alone was only 
attributed to three of the deaths, which was less than 1 % of the reported shootings. Further, none of these 
deaths were caused by the drag-stabilized beanbag. 
One focus of this study was to identify which weapon is most applicable to patrol. The process of 
comparing some of these weapons was like comparing oranges and apples; each is a less lethal weapon, 
but they operate under completely different tactics. The two in question (PepperBall and Shotgun beanbag) 
should realistically fall into different categories on the force continuum and both be added to patrol. 
However, in order to determine which of the two were most useful to patrol, they were measured against 
two common patrol applications - "suicide by cop" incidents and civil unrest. 
In conclusion, the beanbag shotgun combined with the drag-stabilized round was found to be the 
most effective weapon for incapacitating a suicidal subject This was based upon a kinetic impact that was 
10 times greater that the PepperBall. Although the PepperBall also contains OC pepper, its intended effect 
is pain compliance rather than immediate incapacitation. This could yield the subject an opportunity to 
"finish the job", or escalate the officer's force by threatening the police or another. In addition, studies have 
shown that the goal-directed, drug -impaired person, and emotionally disturbed individuals have higher pain 
thresholds and are often unaffected by OC pepper. Also, studies have shown that as many as 68% of the 
subjects involved in past beanbag shootings were so mentally impaired that they would have been unable 
to comply with the officer's commands. That particular subject is not going to be persuaded through pain 
compliance. He must be incapacitated immediately and taken into custody before he can escalate the 
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levels of force. Hence, the need exists for effective less-lethal impact munitions that are immediately 
available to the patrol officer. 
The difficulty presented to this study was the fact that few agencies maintain good records on 
deadly force encounters. When asked how many times an officer fired a weapons at a suspect, regardless 
of the outcome, many city officials do not know the answer. In order to show the effect of providing less 
lethal weapons to patrol officers, we must measure the deadly force encounters prior to and after the 
implementation of a less lethal program. Again, many agencies could neither produce records on the less 
lethal deployments, nor determine whether any changes to deadly force encounters had occurred after they 
began to use the weapons. Other agencies did document the use of less lethal, but failed to separate it 
from deadly force, which made data retrieval cumbersome and impractical. For example, Houston PO uses 
the shotgun beanbag in the patrol division and does document uses. However, they categorize the use of 
the weapon as deadly force, so they were not able to provide information on the number of less lethal or 
lethal force incidents or provide insight into the effectiveness of the less lethal weapon at saving lives. 
Future researchers are encouraged to expand their surveys to a five-year period prior to and after 
implementation of less lethal weapons. 
The results of this study are indeed crucial to law enforcement. Many decision-makers are 
misinformed about the legal requirements for less lethal weapons. Whether or not less lethal weapons save 
lives is the pivot point on which the issue of moral obligation for implementation hinges. At this time, there is 
insufficient data to make an informed opinion. Although case law does not currency mandate such 
programs, concern for the citizens and officers should motivate agencies to take the initiative before it is 
required. Certainly, the data on less lethal weapons is growing with the new technology, and should be 
explored by agencies who desire to make every effort to protect the lives of their citizens, even if it means 
protecting them from themselves. This study has revealed that many proactive Police agencies are tackling 
this task before society mandates it. 
 
References
Bailey, W. (1996). Less-than-Iethal weapons and police-citizen killings in 
U.S. urban areas. Crime and Delinquency. 42 (4),535-552.
Button, P. (1997). The Toronto Canada Police Homepage [On-line] 
Available: http//torontopolice.on.ca/publications/useofforce//essthanlethal.html  
Dahlstrom, D., Powley, K., Fackler, M. (2000). Square Bean Bag Problems.
Wound Ballistics Review. 5 (1), 8-12 
 DeBrito, D., Challoner, A, Sehgal, A, Mallon, W. (2001). Annuls of Emergency 
Medicine. 38 (4),383 
 Graham v. Conner, 490 US.386 (5th Cir. 1989) 
Heal, S. (2000). The push for less-lethal. Law Enforcement Technology. 27 
(11), 72-75 
Hubbs, K., Klinger, D. (1998). Impact Munitions: Database of use and effects.
Unpublished manuscript. 
Ijames, S. (1998). Less than Lethal: Tactics, training, and equipment for the
unconventional encounter. Law and Order. 46 (12),49
Ijames, S. (1999). Less Lethal: Force Options and Legal Challenges. Tactical
Edge. 8 (2), 60 
Kenny, J., Heal, S., Grossman, M. (2001). The Attribute-Based Evaluation 
(ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extend-Range. Impact Munitions [online]. Available: 
http://www.arl.psu.edulareas/defensetech/defensetech.html





Morales, J., Quan, K., Rulon, K. (2001). Portable less lethal patrol alternatives. 
Tactical Edge. 10 (4),49-50 
National Institute of Justice. (1987, March). Report on Attorney General's 
conference on less than lethal weapons (NCJ Publication NO.1 05195). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
National Institute of Justice. (1993, March). NIJ initiative on less-than 
lethal weapons (NCJ Publication No. 133523). Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. 
National Institute of Justice. (1996, April). National data collection on 
police use of force (NCJ Publication No. 160113). Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
National Institute of Justice. (2001, March). Policing and Homicide. 1976 
98:Justifiable Homicide by Police. Police Officers Murdered by felons (NCJ 
Publication No. 180987). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 Omdahl v. Lindholm, 170 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 1999) 
Oneal v. Dekalb (a), 667 F.853 (N.D. G. Antlanta, 1987) 
Oneal v. Dekalb (b), 860 F.2d.899 (11th Cir. 1988) 
Parent, R (1996). Aspects of police use of deadly force in British 
Columbia: The phenomenon of victim-precipitated homicide. Master's thesis, 
Simon Frazier University. Surrey, British Columbia.
Paynter, R. (2000). Suicide by cop. Law Enforcement Technology. 27 (6), 
40-44. 
Pyers, L. (2001), The Police Policy Studies Council Homepage [On-Line]. 
Available: http:www.theppsc.org/ttaff/pyers/articles/ultimate.trap.htm 
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994)
Powley, K., Dahlstrom, D., Fackler, M. (2000). Accuracy comparison of drag
stabilized and square 12-gauge shotgun bean bag projectiles from smoothbore and
rifled barrels. Wound Ballistics Review. 5 (1), 13-16
Ross, D., & Jones, M. (1996) Frequency of training in less-than-Iethal 
force tactics and weapons: results of a two-state survey. Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice. 12 (3), 250-263.
Roy v. City of Lewiston [a]), 1994 WL 129774 (D.Me. 1994) 
Roy v. City of Lewiston [b]), 42 F.3d 691 (1st Cir. 1994) 
Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.Ct.1694 (6th Cir. 1985) 
 
Appendix A 
 Agency _________________ 
Agency Survey by Phone
Contact Person__________________
Number of Officers___________ Contact Number_________________
Y/NDo you have less lethal available to patrol officers
If no, then discontinue survey. 





• Shotgun bean bag rounds 
• PepperBall 
• Other________________________ 




• Shotgun bean bag rounds________/____________________ 
• PepperBall___________________/_____________________ 
• Other_______________________/_____________________ 
How many incidents escalated prior to implementing the Less Lethal where deadly force 
(firearm) had to be used by the patrol officer? (1 year prior to implementation) 
What were the number of suspects killed by officers in those incidents? 
How many incidents escalated after implementing the Less Lethal where deadly force 
(firearm) had to be used by the officer? (1 year following I annual average to date) 
What was the number of suspects killed by officers in those incidents? 
(1 year after/annual average to date) 
 Appendix B 
 Agency____________ 
 Agency Survey on Less Lethal Weapons 
 
 Contact Person_____________
Number of Officers____________ Contact Number____________
Y/NDo you have less lethal available to patrol officers 
If no, then discontinue survey. 
What type of less lethal weapons does patrol use? (Circle all that apply) 
Please list year implemented 
 
 • Taser 
• 37/38mm 
• 40mm 
• Shotgun bean bag rounds 
• PepperBall 
• Other________________________ 





• Shotgun bean bag rounds________/____________________ 
• PepperBall___________________/_____________________ 
• Other_______________________/_____________________ 
How many incidents escalated prior to implementing the Less Lethal where deadly force 
(firearm) had to be used by the patrol officer? (1 year prior to implementation) 
What were the number of suspects killed by officers in those incidents? 
How many incidents escalated after implementing the Less Lethal where deadly force 
(firearm) had to be used by the officer? (1 year following / annual average to date) 
 
What was the number of suspects killed by officers in those incidents? 
(1 year after / annual average to date) 
 
